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Abstract: Argentina is the only country in the world that was “developed” in 1900 and 
“developing”  in  2000.  Although  various  underlying  reasons  have  been  identified 
(chiefly  political  instability,  financial  development,  inflation,  trade  openness,  and 
international financial integration), no study has quantitatively assessed their relative 
importance. This paper tries to fill this gap. We use the power-ARCH framework and 
annual data since 1896 to study how important are these factors vis-à-vis both growth 
and growth volatility. Our results suggest that financial development, trade openness and 
political instability are the main factors, with important differences in terms of their 
short versus long-run behavior. 
JEL Codes: C14, O40, E23, D72
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The general economic trend since the Industrial Revolution is one of economic betterment. Since 1850, 
there has been a clear, sustained and undeterred increase in living standards across the globe. A few 
countries were rich or developed in, say, year 1900 and remain rich or developed in, say, year 2000, for 
instance, the U.S. and the U.K. A few others were developing in 1900 but turned around and by year 2000 
were counted among the developed countries, e.g., Japan and most of the European periphery. The vast 
majority of countries was relatively poor, or developing, in year 1900 and remains so in year 2000. 
There is only one country in the world that was developed in 1900 and developing in 2000. 
Argentina. Although  clearly  placed  among  the  10  highest  incomes  per  capita  in  the  world  in  1900, 
“Argentina's ratio to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, 65 percent in 1973, and a mere 43 percent 
in 1987… Argentina is therefore unique (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003, p. 5).   Unsurprisingly, this 
“Argentine puzzle” has received a great deal of attention and scholars have identified several potential 
reasons,  chiefly  among  them  political  instability,  macroeconomic  volatility,  inflation,  trade  openness,  
public deficit, and international and domestic financial developments. Surprisingly, however, there are no 
studies trying to quantify and assess the relative importance of this array of reasons, at least that we are 
aware of. This paper tries to fill this gap. Our aim is to put forward answers to the following questions: 
What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic and international), 
inflation, openness and political instability and, on the other hand, economic growth and growth volatility?  
Are the impacts of these variables (on economic growth) direct or indirect (via the conditional growth 
volatility)? Does their intensity and sign vary over time, in general and, in particular, do these vary with 
respect to short- versus long-run considerations?  
This paper tries to answer such questions using a power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and annual 
time series data for Argentina covering the period from 1896 to 2000.  In doing so, there are three related 
but different lines of research we should highlight and to which we try to contribute to: the scholarship on 
finance and growth, the economic literature on political instability,
1 and the economic history work on the 
1  Durlauf  et  al.  (2005)  survey  the   macroeconomics  of  growth  and  instability  literature.   One  paper  that  tries  to  link  these 
literatures, and is close to ours in this sense, is Asteriou and Price (2001), which present time series (quarterly data) evidence for 
2so-called Argentinean puzzle.
In terms of the literature on the finance-growth nexus, this paper tries to contribute by putting 
forward novel econometric evidence based on historical data. These allow us to investigate whether the 
impact of   different measures of financial development on growth occurs directly or indirectly, via growth 
volatility.   Levine (2005) reviews the finance-growth literature and argues that the overall consensus is for 
a positive, lasting, significant and causal effect from financial development to economic growth. He also 
shows that the effect is, as expected, stronger from measures of financial efficiency (for instance, the share 
in GDP of credit to the private sector) than from measures of financial depth (such as M3 over GDP). By 
constructing different measures of financial development, in this paper we can throw some light on the 
possible distinction among the effects of different measures over a much longer period of time than 
normally considered in the literature.
2 
One of the main benefits of our choice of econometric framework is that it helps shedding light on  
an  important  and  resilient  puzzle  on  the  relationship  between  output  growth  and  its  volatility. While 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that growth rates are adversely affected by volatility, Grier and Tullock 
(1989) argue that larger standard deviations of  growth  rates   are associated with larger mean rates. We 
argue that separating the predicted from the unpredicted components of growth volatility can be of great 
importance and may be able to generate new insights on this relationship. Moreover, the majority of 
ARCH papers examining the growth-volatility link are restricted to these two key variables. That is, they 
seldom assess whether the effects of the presence of other variables affect the relation and, in the rare 
occasions that happens, they are usually inflation and its volatility that comes into play.
3 One contribution 
the UK since 1960.
2 Our data and framework also allow us to raise a few new questions. In particular, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Tornell et al. 
(2004) and Loayza and Ranciere (2006) note that although the development of the financial system is robustly associated with 
economic growth across countries, it is also often found to be the main predictor of financial crises. That is, the long-run effect of 
finance on growth is positive, while in the short-run the effect is negative. Cross-country heterogeneity, in general, and business 
cycles synchronization issues, in particular, may play an undesirably large role in this result. Because in this paper we use data for 
only one country (Argentina) and we find supporting evidence for this asymmetric dynamic effect, one possible contribution of 
our paper is to help dispel such concerns surrounding this important result. In addition, our framework allows further investigation 
of the workings of these effects as we hypothesize that the short-run effect may work mostly through growth volatility, while the 
long-run work may work directly (that is, on the economic growth rates.)
3  For a comprehensive review of this literature see Fountas et al. (2006).  In addition, Gillman and Kejak (2005) bring together 
for comparison several main approaches to modeling the inflation-growth effect by nesting them within a general monetary 
endogenous growth model with both human and physical capital.
3of this paper is to study if and how the growth-volatility relationship changes in light of a much wider set 
of variables. Note also that the use of annual data allows us to perform a more appropriate test of the 
hypothesis that predicts a positive effect of output variability and uncertainty on the growth rate of output.
4 
We present our main results in three blocs: direct, indirect and dynamic (short and long-run) 
effects. We find evidence for direct influences from financial development, informal political instability 
(e.g. guerilla warfare),  trade openness and public deficit, and equally importantly no such evidence from 
international  financial  markets  (UK  interest  rate),  inflation  and  formal  political  instability  (e.g. 
constitutional  changes).  Sensitivity  analysis  helps  narrowing  this  set  down  to  financial  development 
(positive) and trade openness (negative) as major drivers of growth.  One particularly important result is 
that when we investigate the impacts of financial development and informal instability jointly, the latter 
seems to vanish (the exception being guerrilla warfare) thus reinforcing the evidence for an important role 
of financial development on economic growth.   How does this set of variables affect predicted growth 
volatility (and thus growth via volatility)? The evidence for indirect effects we find is mostly from formal 
political instability, inflation, trade openness and public deficit.  Further robustness tests shows that the 
main  (negative)  impacts  are  from  formal  instability  and  openness.  Finally,  our  investigation  of  the 
dynamic effects shows important differences in terms of short and long run behavior of our key variables: 
the informal instability  effects (antigovernment demonstrations and assassinations) are larger in the short- 
than in the long-run, while those for financial development and trade openness are negative in the short- 
but positive in the long-run.  In addition to their novelty, we believe the importance of these findings is 
also in terms of the policy lessons they can generate. The vast existing literature has said little in this 
respect.   In this paper, we show that although the positive direct effects of financial development dominate 
the negative ones of informal political instability, the formal instability is detrimental to growth via the 
volatility channel and, together with trade openness, may have played a substantial role in the demise of 
the Argentinean economy since the 1890s.
4 Black (1987) argues that investments in riskier technologies will be pursued only if the expected return on these investments 
(expressed as the average rate of output growth) is large enough to compensate for the extra risk. As real investment takes time to 
materialize, such an effect would be more likely to obtain in empirical studies utilizing low-frequency data.
4The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  sets  the  historical  context  for  the  paper  by 
documenting the decline of Argentina from a position of a rich or developed country in year 1900 to that 
of  a  middle-income  or  developing  country  in  year  2000.  Section  3  describes  the  data  and  Section  4 
provides  details  and  justification  for  our  econometric  methodology.  Section  5  has  our  baseline 
econometric results and the results from various sensitivity tests are presented in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes and suggests directions for future research.
2.  THE ARGENTINE RIDDLE
Argentina is unique. For about three centuries, it was part of the Spanish colonial empire. It became 
independent in the early XIXth century. Uncharacteristically, the Argentinean Independence was a rather 
complicated process. It stretches from the May Revolution in 1810, through the July 9th declaration in 
1816  (when  the  United  Spanish  Provinces  of  South America  unilaterally  declare  independence)  and 
culminates in 1824 with the defeat of the Spanish Empire in the battle of Ayacucho.
Characteristically, the fifty or so years that followed were marked by severe political instability. 
There was a long sequence of civil wars, mainly opposing the interests of the capital, Buenos Aires, to 
those  of  the  provinces.  This  is  a  period  of  rather  modest  growth  rates  which  ended  with  national 
unification. The Industrial Revolution in Europe fueled demand for primary products and provided new 
means to satisfy it through important technological innovations: around 1875 the transportation of meat 
from the other side of the world was made possible and it was made cheap.
There is little disagreement among economists that the period from 1875 to the eve of World War I  
is the Golden Age, or the Belle Époque, of Argentinean economic history (Taylor, 1992; Sanz-Villarroya, 
2007). Just to illustrate this, note that for the year 1913, della Paolera and Taylor (2003) estimate income 
per capita in Argentina to be (in 1992 US Dollars) around USD 3,797. They show that this is higher than 
the corresponding figures for France and Germany (USD 3,452 and USD 3,134) and is substantially 
higher than the same figures for Spain or Italy. Massive inflows of foreign capital (physical as well as 
human) supported the rapid expansion of the exports of primary products (grain, meat, wool and leather) 
5which couple with favorable international conditions, ultimately fuelled very rapid rates of economic 
growth. There is also little disagreement that the Argentina's uniqueness is because no other country 
climbed down so dramatically from the selected group of advanced, rich or developed countries. 
The major disagreement among economic historians to this day is not  whether but actually   when 
(and, of course,   why) this unchecked decline started. Some argue that it started with the 1930 crisis (e.g., 
Diaz-Alejandro 1985), others argue for an earlier turning point (for instance, Taylor suggests 1913), while  
Sanz-Villarroya (2005) estimates that the first important structural break for Argentina happens in 1899.
5
Irrespective  of  exactly  when  the  decline  started,  its  existence  was  not  undisputed  until  the 
immediate post II World War. In 1947 Argentina was still ranked the 10th country in the world in terms of 
per capita income (Alston and Gallo, 2007, p. 6). della Paolera and Taylor (2003) note that “by 1900 
Argentina's income per capita had risen from about 67 per cent of developed country-levels in 1870, to 90 
percent in 1900, and 100 per cent in 1913 Whatever its exact status in 1913, for all practical purposes 
Argentina  was  an  advance  country”  (2003,  p.  5).  They  also  calculate  that  since  then  the  ratio  of 
Argentina's income to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, then to 65 percent in 1973, and then to 43 
percent in 1987. This ratio rebounds in the 1990s but again reverts with the 2001 crisis.
6 Last, but not 
least, it should not go unnoticed that in a recent book on the Great Depressions of the XXth Century 
(Kehoe and Prescott, 2007), Argentina is the only country that has two chapters (out of 16) entirely and 
solely dedicated to its economy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a vast literature on the Argentine puzzle, providing 
alternative explanations for its long-run relative economic decline. One argument is that increased direct 
competition  in  international  markets  during  and  after  WWI  (especially  from  the  other  areas  of  new 
settlement,  i.e.  Australia  and  Canada)  has  an  important  role  to  play,  as  does  the  sharp  decline  in  
immigration and foreign capital inflows. One other argument is that its relative decline is well explained 
5 Below we present and discuss our Bai-Perron estimates of the date of structural breaks in Argentinean growth. We find (and 
adjust our estimates accordingly below) evidence for two structural breaks: 1922 and 1964 (for a full treatment of this issue, see 
Campos et al. 2008).    
6 Growth was negative from 1999 onwards culminating with around -10% in year 2002. The 2001 crisis entailed a default on 
large part of the external debt, devaluation, inflation, and the freezing of bank accounts (the   corralito.) Riots, looting and anti-
government demonstrations followed. See Kehoe (2003) for a discussion.
6by the fact that the agricultural frontier was reached much earlier in Argentina than in Australia and 
Canada. Australia's restrictive immigration policy contrasts with Argentina's liberal one, which has been 
blamed by Diaz-Alejandro (1985) among others, for the difficulties in sustaining and raising productivity 
levels. Solberg (1987) argues for another reason, this time in terms of Argentina’s adoption of a land 
distribution policy that favored large farm holdings and sustained high levels of wealth inequality. In light 
of the very accommodating migration policy, the large inflows of workers end up concentrating in Buenos 
Aires and gave rise to a well-organized and increasingly powerful worker's union movement. It suffices to 
say that this movement was intimately tangled with the Peron governments, after WWII.
Finance has also received a great deal of attention in terms of its potential role in explaining the 
Argentinean decline (della Paolera and Taylor, 1998). For example, Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-
Villarroya  (2006)  argue  that  contract  intensive  money  is  actually  the  key  factor  in  explaining  the 
Argentinean puzzle. Taylor (2003) associates the Argentine decline to extremely low savings rates (the 
high  population  dependency  rate  linked  to  the  immigration  policy).  This  argument  combines  with 
Solberg’s view and highlights the issue of (restricted) access to finance as a way of perpetuating high 
inequality levels. Moreover, the role of the financial sector does not need to be limited to domestic or 
national aspects. Many believe that there may have been excessive dependence on foreign capital in the 
Belle Époque (British foreign capital to be precise) and the associated radical changes around WWI as an 
important cause of the Argentinean decline (Taylor, 1992). 
Such radical shifts in market conditions extended from the financial to the goods markets, the 
emphasis here being on international trade. Until 1914, Argentina was an aggressive exporter exhibiting 
extremely high levels of openness to international trade (measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP.) The data we use in this paper (more details below) shows that this ratio exceeds 50% in the years 
immediately before WWI, with a clearly declining trend in the inter-wars years (the ratio goes down from 
about 45% to 20% in these twenty years), and it never exceeds 25% from 1945 to almost 2000. If one 
believes that exports alone are a major driving force of economic growth, then these numbers surely 
provide fuel to placing openness as a major reason for the Argentine decline (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970). One 
7important caveat that should be mentioned in this context is that it is unclear (and still much debated) what 
were the reasons for such a reversal. In particular, the debate is whether this was mainly the disruption and 
closing up of international markets first with WWI and then with the Great Depression, or was it mainly 
the adoption of excessively protectionist policies by successive Argentinean governments. Note that these 
policies inspired and were later reinforced by the import substitution model advocated by the leading Latin  
American economist of the time, Raul Prebish (from Argentina.)
In  addition  to  trade  policies,  many  scholars  believe  that  standard  macroeconomic  policies,  in 
general, and their lack of consistency and the resulting high degree of macroeconomic instability, in 
particular, are also to blame. For instance, della Paollera et al. (2003) show how public deficits throughout 
Argentinean history (and inflation, mostly since the 1970s), also seem to play also an important role in 
explaining the decline. 
Although there is a large literature associating the long-run relative decline of the Argentinean 
economy  with  political  factors,
7  we  are  unaware  of  studies  that  try  to  quantitatively  evaluate  this 
association. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) observe that: “The political history of Argentina 
reveals an extraordinary pattern where democracy was created in 1912, undermined in 1930, re-created in 
1946, undermined in 1955, fully re-created in 1973, undermined in 1976, and finally reestablished in 
1983” (2006, p. 7). In a recent paper, Alston and Gallo (2007) identify the onset of widespread electoral 
fraud in the 1930s as a turning point for the erosion of the rule of law and one main reason for the 
Argentinean decline. 
In what follows, we take these considerations on board in trying to provide a comprehensive 
quantitative account of the relative importance of the main reasons often identified with the Argentinean 
debacle,  namely  political  instability,  domestic  financial  development,  trade  openness,  macroeconomic 
volatility (inflation and public deficits) and the international financial system.  
 
3. DATA
7 See also della Paolera and Taylor (2003) and references therein.
8The data set we put together for this paper comprises various measures of financial development, political 
instability,  economic  growth  as  well  as  a  number  of  additional  explanatory  variables  reflecting  well-
established alternative explanations for the Argentinean decline. We use various measures of financial 
development.  One  is  the  ratio  of  M3  to  GDP,   from Alston  and  Gallo  (2007).  The  main  reason  for 
considering this variable is that it has been used extensively in the finance-growth literature (King and 
Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005). One well-known drawback of this measure, however, is that the ratio of M3 
to GDP reflects financial depth or the relative size of the financial system. It does not necessarily reflect 
how efficient the financial system actually is. We also use a narrower version of this variable (M1 over 
GDP) to check for the robustness of our results (source of the data for this measure is Bordo et al., 2001). 
Our other two measures of financial development try to capture the efficiency of the financial sector, not 
its relative size. The source for both is Mitchell (2003). The first is the bank deposits by the private sector 
over GDP (private deposits or PD), which we believe is a good proxy for the share of credit to the private 
sector over GDP. Our second measure from Mitchell (2003) is the total deposits in savings banks over 
GDP. Given its more restrictive nature and the fact that the exact definition of savings bank contains an 
unobservable legal element, we use this variable mostly for robustness check thereby attaching greater 
weight to PD.
We also explore the hypothesis that different types of political instability have different effects on 
economic  growth.
8  This  is  done  by  further  developing  the  distinction  between  formal  and  informal 
political  instability  introduced  in  Campos  and  Karanasos  (forthcoming).  The  distinction  is  based  on 
whether or not different forms of instability originate from within the political system: guerrilla warfare 
are thus informal political instability, while constitutional reforms are classified as formal instability. In 
addition  to  the  obvious  policy  implications  this  taxonomy  generates  (in  a  literature  in  which  policy 
implications are scarce), this distinction allows us to investigate questions that naturally have not been 
investigated so far, such as whether or not the effects of some forms of informal instability are more 
8 Another puzzle we are interested in regards the duration of the political instability effects: while the conventional wisdom is that 
these are severe in the long-run, Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) argue that they are significantly 
stronger in the shorter- than in the long-run. In Campos and Nugent (2002), the long-run effect vanishes when the African 
countries are excluded from the estimation and when institutions are taken into account.
9severe in short-run, whether or not they vanish in the long-run, and whether or not the main effect of 
formal instability occurs through growth volatility. One of our hypotheses is that the answer to these three 
questions  is  the  same  (“yes”)  and  below  we  provide  further  justification  as  well  as  full  econometric 
support. 
Our  informal  political  instability  variables
9  are  as  follows:  anti-government  demonstrations 
(peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people), assassinations (defined as politically motivated murder 
or attempted murder of a high government official or politician), strikes (a general strike of 1,000 or more 
workers involving more multiple employers and aimed at government policies), and guerrilla warfare 
(armed activity, sabotage, or bombings by independent bands of citizens and aimed at regime overthrow). 
Most of these series are available since 1919. Our informal political instability variables are as follows: 
the  number  of  cabinet  changes,  the  size  of  the  cabinet,  the  number  of  constitutional  changes  and 
legislative elections.
 Our basic data source is the Cross National Time Series Data set (Banks 2005) which 
contains  historical  series  on  income  per  capita  and  various  dimensions  of  instability.
10  This  is  a 
commercial database that has been extensively used in the scholarship on growth and political instability 
(Durlauf et al., 2005.) Data are available yearly for Argentina from 1896 until 2000, for various instability 
series, excluding the two World War years (that is, 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945).
Our measures of inflation, trade openness and public deficit are from  Alston and Gallo (2007). 
Inflation is measured as yearly changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Public deficit is proxied as the 
ratio  of  the  federal  deficit  to  GDP,  but  it  does  exclude  state-owned  enterprises.
11  Trade  openness  is 
measured in standard fashion as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP.  Alston and Gallo (2007) have 
carried out various necessary adjustments to underlying data from Venganzones and Winograd (1997), 
from the Ministry of Economy of Argentina and from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Finally,  international  financial  sector  developments  have  also  been  repeatedly  blamed  for 
9 Our political instability variables enter one by one in the econometric framework we use, so our results are not affected by the 
taxonomy and as such it is used simply to facilitate the interpretation.   
10 We have obtained GDP growth and level figures from various other sources (as well as industrial output series) and initial 
results (not reported) show that these different measures do not affect our results below.
11  Because the original inflation series contain a number of obvious outliers between the years 1987 and 1991 (reaching almost 
5,000% in 1989), we lower the relative weight of these observations for estimation.
10Argentina’s poor economic performance. There are two aspects of this issue that are often said o play a 
role: the first being the credit crunch associated with the onset of WWI and with the Great Crisis of 1929, 
and the second being the change in global financial   leadership which went from London to New York 
during this period. We must say that we proceed as if the second aspect is less important, but also that we 
are absolutely sure it is much more difficult to measure than the first. Thus, in standard fashion in this type 
of study, we use the level of interest rates in the United Kingdom as our proxy for the overall conditions in 
international financial markets (the source of these data is Bordo et al. 2001). Because the transition to the 
U.S. financial leadership is often said to be even less beneficial to Argentina (mainly because American 
investors  often  refrained  to  take  managerial  control  of Argentine  firms),  our  estimates  for  this  effect 
should be conservative and if at all biased will show a smaller than actual effect of the international 
financial market in the Argentinean decline.
4. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly gained currency in the 
finance literature.
12 Let growth (yt ) follow a white noise process augmented by a risk premium defined in 
terms of volatility:
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where   xit is  either  the  political  instability  or  the  financial  development  variable  or  one  of  the  other 
explanatory variables. .
13
  In  addition,   } { t e   are  independently  and  identically  distributed  (i.i.d)  random  variables  with
0 ) 1 ( ) (
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12   See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005, 2008) use this process to model output growth 
and inflation respectively.
13     Because the original financial development, openness, public deficit and UK interest rate variables,  are I(1), they enter our 
models in first differences.
11sigma-algebraå -1 t , which is generated by  }. , , { 2 1  - - t t y y  
In other words,   htdenotes the conditional variance of growth. In particular,   htis specified as an 
asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth included in the variance equation:
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whered (with 0 > d ) is the heteroscedasticity parameter,   a andb are the ARCH and GARCH coefficients 
respectively,   V   with   1 < V  is the leverage term andg is the level term for the   lth lag of growth.
14 In 
order to distinguish the general PARCH model from a version in which   d  is fixed (but not necessarily 
equal to two) we refer to the latter as (P)ARCH.
 
The PARCH model increases the flexibility of the conditional variance specification by allowing 
the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure in the volatility pattern is the 
strongest. This feature in the volatility process has important implications for the relationship between 
political instability, finance, inflation, and growth and its volatility. There is no strong reason for assuming 
that the conditional variance is a linear function of lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared 
term  in  this  role  is  most  likely  to  be  a  reflection  of  the  normality  assumption  traditionally  invoked.  
However, if we accept that growth data are very likely to have a non-normal error distribution, then the 
superiority of a squared term is unwarranted and other power transformations may be more appropriate.
The PARCH model may also be viewed as a standard GARCH model for observations that have 
been  changed  by  a  sign-preserving  power  transformation  implied  by  a  (modified)  PARCH 
parameterization. He and Teräsvirta (1999) emphasize that if the standard Bollerslev type of model is 
augmented by the heteroscedasticity parameter (the power term), the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH 
coefficients almost certainly change.
15 
14 The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and the asymmetric absolute 
residuals.
15 Karanasos and Schurer (2008) find that the relationship between the variable and its conditional variance is sensitive to changes 
in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the estimated values of the in-mean and the level effects are 
125. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We present our main reasons in three interdependent blocs: the direct, indirect and dynamic (short and 
long-run) effects. We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model in equations (1) and (2) in 
order to take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power transformations of our 
time series data. The Tables below report the estimated parameters of interest for the period 1896-2000. 
These were obtained by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The 
best fitting specification is chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value 
of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity in the conditional mean has been 
accounted for, our specifications appear to capture the serial correlation in the growth series.
16
Our set of variables tries to reflect the different explanations for the Argentinean puzzle previously 
put  forward  by  economic  historians.  This  set  comprises  domestic  and  international  financial 
developments, informal and formal political instability, inflation and public deficit, and the degree of 
openness to international trade. In order to study the direct effects of our set of explanatory variables, we 
specify  model  1  with 0 = = g f in  equation  2,  while  model  2  with 0 = l in  equation  1  allows  us  to 
investigate their indirect impacts on growth.
 17 
5.1. Direct Growth Effects 
Table 1 reports the results from our estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model for each one of the elements in 
our set of explanatory variables. The parameter we are most interested in isl  (in the last column.) The 
results reveal that the direct effects of financial development on per capita economic growth rates are 
positive  and  statistically  significant,  those  of  trade  openness,  informal  political  instability  (guerrilla 
fragile to changes in the power term.
16 For all cases, we find that the leverage term is insignificant, so we re-estimate excluding this parameter.
17 As indicated in the previous section we jointly estimate the conditional mean and variance of growth in order to take into 
account PARCH effects. At the same time, with a limited number of time-series observations the non-linear structure should not 
be overextended  as this imposes excessive requirements on the data. Therefore, we estimate the direct (model 1) and indirect 
(model 2) effects separately. 
13warfare) and public deficit are negative,
18 whereas the effects of formal political instability, international 
financial developments (interest rate in the United Kingdom) and inflation are not statistically significant, 
at conventional levels.
As for the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in   all cases the estimates are statistically significant 
and positive which is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987). Also the estimated power term 
coefficientsd  are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC)  criteria choosing a (P)ARCH specification with 
estimated power term ranging from 0.8 (e.g., inflation) to 0.9 (e.g., public deficit.)
 19
How  robust  are  these  baseline  individual  results? As  discussed  above,  previous  research  on 
Argentina  has  given  considerable  weight  to  the  roles  of  informal  political  instability  and  financial 
development. It is not as surprising therefore that these are the two  dominant influences since they are the 
ones we estimate with greatest precision. One first robustness test would be to investigate whether or not 
such powerful and precise effects obtain in the presence of the other explanatory variables. In other words, 
we want to be sure that they remain if we add to the baseline specification any of our four additional 
variables. Tables 2 and 3 have these results. Table 2 present these results in great detail for the case of 
inflation, while Table 3 only reports the main parameters of interest for trade openness, public deficit, and 
UK interest rates.
20  
 The parameters we are most interested in Table 2 are   l 1 and   l 2. Panel B reinforces that formal 
political instability have no direct effects on growth (cf.   l 1) and the same conclusion remains for the case 
of inflation. In the latter case (i.e., for   l 2  ), this is correct for all three panels so our previous results still 
hold. Interestingly, Panel C shows that the direct effect of financial development is little affected by the 
addition of inflation to the model, with all four indicators still showing a positive effect and only one of 
them (M3/GDP) now becoming statistically insignificant. It should be stressed that the effects from the 
indicators of financial depth are weaker than those from indicators of financial efficiency, which as noted 
18  This result for trade openness is clearly unexpected. Notice, however, that we show below that its short-run effects are negative 
but the long-run impact is positive.
19  Notice that in all our estimations the   ARCH and GARCH parameters (α and   β)  are highly significant in the majority of the 
cases.  (see Tables 1,2,5,6,8 and 9). Also the estimated power term coefficients δ are  stable ranging from 0.80 to 1.00.
20 The complete results are available from the authors’ upon request. 
14above is a result that easily echoes previous findings in the wider growth-finance literature. Panel A 
shows, however, that accounting for inflation weakens the influence of informal instability. Although the 
results for the four forms of instability retain their negative sign only guerrilla warfare still shows a strong 
negative growth impact. In terms of the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases remains statistically 
significant and positive.
Table 3 summarizes the main results when we add the three remaining explanatory variables. 
Notice we only report these results for informal political instability and financial development because we 
have shown above that formal instability has no direct impact.
21 Panel A of table 3 shows our estimates for 
l 1 and   l 2, as before for the case of informal political instability, but with   l 2 now reflecting respectively 
the direct effects of trade openness (columns 1 and 2), public deficit (columns 3 and 4) and UK interest 
rates (columns 5 and 6.) Starting with the case of trade openness, all four informal political instability 
variables show the expected negative and statistically significant direct effects. As for the direct impact of 
trade openness itself, although it is always negative it is statistically significant in only half of the cases. 
The effects of public deficit disappear whereas those for informal instability tend to retain their statistical 
significance (the exception being assassinations.) Finally, it is very interesting to see that UK interest rate 
now show the expected negative and significant influence in three out of four cases (the exception is for 
general strikes,) and this has also somewhat mixed effects in terms of informal instability (the negative 
impact remaining significant for guerrilla warfare and assassinations.)
22  
Panel  B  of  table  3  shows  our  estimates  for   l 1  and   l 2  as  before  for  the  case  of  financial 
development. All four financial development variables still show the expected positive and statistically 
significant direct impact for both trade openness and UK interest rates (M3 over GDP looses significance 
for the public deficit case). As for the influence of trade openness, it is still negative and statistically 
significant in three out of the four cases, while for public deficit the estimate of  l 2   is significant in only 
21  Although formal political instability does not affect growth directly, as we will see below, we find it affects growth volatility 
(that is, it has important indirect effects.) We return to these issues in great detail in sub-section 5.2 below.
22 This  also  suggests  that  future  research  may  do  well  in  further  exploring  the  relationship  between  financial  globalization 
(integration) and domestic political instability.
15one case. Once we control for domestic financial development, the coefficients on the UK interest rates 
become insignificant again.  
One  last  important  robustness  test  regards  the  joint  direct  effects  of  the  two  main  reasons 
highlighted by previous research on the Argentinean puzzle, namely financial development and informal 
political instability. Table 4 presents these results.
23 It is obviously clear that the influence of financial 
development dominates that of informal instability. Despite the fact that all of our sixteen estimates of   l 1 
are still negative, only those related to guerrilla warfare remain statistically significant. Not surprisingly in 
light of previous results, the direct impact of M3 over GDP is not statistically significant. Yet all other  
estimates of   l 2 for financial development remain positive and statistically significant (the one exception 
being savings deposits with guerrilla warfare.)
In summary, we find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct effects on 
economic  growth  in  Argentina,  turn  out  to  be  financial  development  and  trade  openness.  Although 
informal political instability also seems to play an important role, we find that only one aspect seems to 
survive our battery of sensitivity tests, that being guerrilla warfare. We now turn to the investigation of the 
indirect effects. 
5.2. Indirect (Via Volatility) Effects 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for each one of the elements in our data set for what we call the 
indirect  effect,  which  is  the  effect  on  growth  via  the  volatility  channel. The  parameter  we  are  most 
interested in is   f  (in the next to last column.) The results reveal that the indirect effects of trade openness 
and formal political instability (constitutional changes) on the conditional volatility of per capita economic 
growth rates are negative and statistically significant whereas those of inflation and public deficit are 
positive. Interestingly, domestic and international financial development, and formal instability have no 
indirect impact.
 24
23 The full results are not reported for the sake of space, we report only the two main parameters of interest. They are similar to 
those fully discussed above and are available from the authors’ upon request. 
24 In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in the Tables, various lags of growth (from 1 to 12) were considered 
with the best model (l = 6) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC.
16As  above,  we  proceed  by  investigating  the  robustness  of  these  results.  Specifically,  and  for 
comparability purposes, we ask how the results from the various aspects of financial development and 
political instability change if we have in the baseline model one of the four explanatory variables. Tables 6 
and 7 present these results as before with Table 6 reporting the full set of estimates for the inflation case, 
and table 7 summarizing the results (only for formal  instability) form the remaining three variables in our 
set. 
As it can be seen in Table 6, the indirect negative effect of formal political instability remains 
statistically significant throughout (Panel B). Focusing our attention on the  f 1 and   k parameters, we can 
see that all four forms of formal instability affect volatility negatively   f 1  ) 0 ( 1 < f  and, since 0 > k , they 
affect  growth  negatively  as  well.  Interestingly,  only  one  financial  development  and  one  informal 
instability measure reveals such indirect effects. (instead, as discussed above, they exhibit a direct impact  
on  growth).  That  is,  it  appears  that  the  volatility  of  growth  is  independent  of  changes  in  financial 
development and informal instability.  These results reinforce the notion that the type of political instability 
matters  vis-à-vis  economic  growth:  while  informal  may  have  a  direct  effect,  the  impact  of  formal 
instability operates indirectly, via growth volatility. Moreover, evidence for a positive impact of inflation 
on volatility also remains strong. This is in line with the theoretical argument in Dortsey and Sarte (2000).  
Moreover, notice that since the estimates for the in-mean parameter (k) and the level coefficient (γ) are 
statistically  significant  and  positive  there  is  strong  evidence  for  a  positive  bi-directional  feedback 
relationship between growth and its volatility,
25 which is robust to the presence of various finance and 
instability variables and inflation. Table 7 summarizes the results for the other three explanatory variables 
in our basic set. There is widespread support for the previous formal political instability results (the 
exception being for the case of cabinet size). We also find robust evidence for the negative indirect impact 
of trade openness and, slightly less so, for the positive influence of UK interest rates, while the results for 
public deficit become considerably more mixed. 
25 The existing empirical literature focuses mainly on the effect of volatility on growth, see Fountas et al. (2006) and Fountas and 
Karanasos (2007).
17In summary, we find robust evidence that both informal political instability and trade openness 
affect growth indirectly its volatility. No other variables in our basic set exhibit such robust estimates of 
their indirect effects.
5.3. Dynamic Aspects 
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our baseline results. 
Another potential benefit from this exercise is that the required use of lags may help ameliorate any 
lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- and long- run relationships we employ 
the following error correction (P)ARCH form 
, ) ( 1 , 1 , t t i t l t i t u x c y x y + - - + D = D - - - z j q (3)
where q  and ζ captures the short and long-run effects respectively, andj is the speed of adjustment to the 
long-run relationship.
26 This is accomplished by embedding a long-run growth regression into an ARDL 
model.
27 In other words, the term in parenthesis contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a 
forcing equilibrium condition
, t it t x c y e z + + = (4)
where t e is ) 0 ( I . The lag of the first difference of either the political instability or financial development 
variable or one of the explanatory variables ( l t i x - D , ) characterizes the short-run effect. The condition for 
the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the coefficient on the error-
correction term be negative and not lower than -2 (that is,   0 2 < < - j ). We also take into account the 
PARCH effects by specifying the error term ut  as follows
    ,
2
1
t t t h e u =                               (5)
where
26 As pointed out by Loayaza and Rancière (2006) the requirements for the validity of this methodology are that: i) there exists a 
long-run relationship between the variables of interest and, ii) the dynamic specification of the model is sufficiently augmented so 
that the regressors are strictly exogenous and the resulting residual is serially uncorrelated.
27 For details on the “ARDL approach,” see Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).
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Table  8  presents  the  results  on  the  estimation  of  short  and  long-run  parameters  linking  the  four 
explanatory variables with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficient on the error correction term (j ) 
lies  within  the  dynamically  stable  range ) 0 , 2 (- .  From  investigating  whether  dynamic  considerations 
affect our conclusions, we find important differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our 
explanatory variables, more specifically, while the effect of public deficit (negative) is similar in the long- 
and  short-run,  that  of  the  UK  interest  rate  is  negative  in  the  short-  and  positive  in  the  long-run. 
Interestingly, trade openness has only a positive long-run impact on growth.
Table  9  presents  the  results  on  the  estimation  of  the  dynamic  parameters  linking  informal 
instability and financial development with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficient on the error 
correction term (j ) lies within the dynamically stable range ) 0 , 2 (- . More precisely, the estimates of   j  
for informal instability and financial development lie within  the range  74 . 0 -   to   43 . 0 - and   85 . 0 -  to 
44 . 0 - , respectively.
Regarding the short and long-run estimates,   q  and   ζ we focus our analysis first on those obtained 
from  the  informal  instability  variables.  All  four  estimates  of  the  short-run  coefficients  are  highly  
significant and negative and for two cases their absolute values are higher than the corresponding values 
for the long-run coefficients (for assassinations, the long-run effect is not significantly different from 
zero). This provides supporting evidence for the notion that the duration of the political instability effect 
does indeed matter and, for antigovernment demos and assassinations, such effects tend to be considerably 
stronger in the short- than in the long-run as previously noted by Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch 
and Sandler (2004).  
Next we discuss the results regarding the financial development variables. In the long-run, we find 
that  financial  development  affects  growth  positively.  This  result  is  very  much  in  line  with  the  large 
empirical literature reviewed by Levine (2005) and it is interesting we can reproduce it with our rather 
19different methodology. Maybe more interestingly, the short-run coefficients tell a very differently story: 
we find that the short-run impact of financial development on growth is negative and significant. Thus our 
results square well with recent findings by Loayaza and Rancière (2006), among others, in that the sign of 
the relationship between economic growth and financial development depends on whether the movements 
are temporary or permanent (the effect being negative in the former and positive in the latter.) Finally, it is 
noteworthy that our results are robust to various measures of financial development and also that the 
stronger  long-run  effects  we  obtain  are  for  our   measures  of  financial  efficiency  rather  than  for  our 
measures of the size of the financial sector (according to Levine, 2005, this is also in line with the recent 
evidence). 
5.4 Breaks
One  final  important  robustness  test  regards  the  role  of  structural  breaks.  We  use  the  methodology 
developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there are any structural breaks in growth, its 
volatility, the various political instability series and the first differences of the four financial development  
variables. Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under very 
general conditions on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these 
statistics identify the number and location of multiple breaks.
In the case of the economic growth series (and, interestingly, also for growth volatility) the Bai-
Perron methodology supports two structural break points.
28 The first occurs for year 1922 and the second 
for year 1964.  For our political instability variables, we find no structural breaks for the assassinations, 
guerilla  warfare,  cabinet  and  constitutional  changes  series,
29  and  we  also  find  no  breaks  in  the  four 
financial development variables. 
However,   our Bai-Perron results support   that general strikes have one structural break, which is 
dated for year 1955. This is a result of great importance: 1955 is the year of the military coup in which 
President   Juan  Domingo  Perón  was   overthrown  by  the  military  thus  concluding   a defining chapter in 
28 As a measure of volatility we use the power transformed absolute growth
d
t y .
29 Our data shows no guerilla warfare before 1948 and after 1977. 
20Argentine history.   Further, we also find one structural break in cabinet size and legislative elections (they 
are dated 1946 and 1949, respectively) while in anti-government demonstrations we find two breaks dated 
1954 and 1972.
30  
In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1), (2) and (5), thus taking into 
account breaks in the political instability variables and in the volatility of growth. First, we introduce the 
following notation.   t D1 , t D2  are (intercept) dummies defined as   D1t,   D2t = 1   in the periods 1922-2000 and 
1964-2000,  respectively,  and   D1t,   D2t = 0  otherwise.  Similarly,   it D  is a (slope) dummy indicating the 
period which starts from the year of the break in the political instability variable ( it x ). For example for 
strikes and government crises   it D  = 1   in the period from 1955 to 2000 whereas for cabinet size   it D  = 1 
during the period from 1946 until the end of the sample.
The augmented model is given by
, t it it d it t t x D x kh c y e l l + + + + =
and   (6)
( ) . 2
1 1
2
1 2 2 1 1
2
it it d it l t t t t t t t x D x y h e f h D D h f f g b a w w w
d d d
+ + + + + + + = - - - -
Recall that the coefficients j  and l  capture the impacts of the political instability variable on growth and 
its volatility respectively. Similarly,   d j  and   d l  correspond to the two effects from the year of the break 
onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by     j  and   l  in the period up to the year of the structural 
break, and by   j   +   d j  and   l   +   d l  during the period from the year of the break until the end of the 
sample. As above in order to study the direct effects of political instability and financial development we 
30 With arguably one exception (anti-government demonstrations in 1972, which were motivated by demands for the return of 
Perón   from exile), all the structural breaks in our political instability series occur during   Perón governments. Perón was elected 
president three times. His first term is from 1946 to 1952. He is re-elected in 1951, his second term starts in 1952 and ends 
abruptly in 1955. His third term is between 1973 (allowed to return from Spain after 18-year exile) and 1974 (suffers fatal heart 
attack.) Although marked by severe economic problems, the second term (1951 to 1955) is more often remembered by the 
political instability (the various terrorist attacks being a sad prelude to the so-called “Dirty War” of 1970s.)
21specify model 1 with   j  =  d j  = 0, while model 2 with   l   =  d l  = 0   allows us to investigate their indirect 
impacts on growth.
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the conditional variance equation (5), 
as follows





1 1 2 2 1 1
2 (7)
Overall, we find our results (not reported) to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break 
dummies.
31 That is, (i) informal instability have a direct negative effect on growth, while formal instability 
have an indirect (through volatility) negative impact on growth, (ii) financial development affects growth 
positively in the long-run but negatively in the short-run, (iii) the effects of the informal instability are 
significantly stronger in the short- than in the long-run.
It is also noteworthy that the causal negative effect of strikes reflects the period 1955-2000, which 
is  not  surprising  given  the  intricate  relationship  between  the  Peron  government  and  organized  labor. 
Interestingly, before 1949 there is no causal effect from legislative elections to growth volatility, whereas 
after  1949  a  negative  impact  began  to  exist.  Finally,  the  coefficient  of  M3  over  GDP  also  becomes 
insignificant, while the same does not happen to the other measures, which go beyond the size of the 
financial sector. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Using  a  PARCH  framework  and  data  for  Argentina  from  approximately  1890  to  2000  we  ask  the 
following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic 
and international), inflation, trade openness and political instability and, on the other hand, economic 
31 The results (not reported) are also robust to the inclusion of intercept dummies   ( t D1 , t D2 ) in the mean equation for growth as 
well.
22growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically different? 
Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, 
do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations?   We find that the main explanatory 
factors, solely in terms of their direct effects on economic growth in Argentina, turn out to be financial 
development and trade openness. Although informal political instability also seems to play an important 
role, we find that only one aspect seems to survive our battery of sensitivity tests, guerrilla warfare. 
Further,   we find robust evidence that both formal political instability and trade openness affect growth 
indirectly  via  its  volatility.  No  other  variables  in  our  basic  set  exhibit  such  robust  estimates  of  their 
indirect  effects.  From  investigating  whether  dynamic  considerations  affect  our  conclusions,  we  find 
important differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our key variables, more specifically, 
while the effect of political instability (negative) is similar in the long- and short-run, that of financial 
development is negative in the short- and positive in the long-run whereas trade openness has only a 
positive long-run impact.
These findings are interest in themselves but they also matter because they raise a number of new 
questions that we believe may be useful in motivating future research. Here we highlight two suggestions. 
Regarding the role of finance in the process of economic development, our finding reinforces a large body 
of previous research in that we also show a strong, positive impact of financial development on growth in 
the long-run. We find that different forms of political instability affect growth through different channels 
over  different  time  windows,  making  up  for  a  strong  and  rather  resilient  effect  that  seem  really  too 
powerful vis-à-vis the benefits brought to the table by financial development. We can not forget however 
that Argentina is unique: no other country in the world since the Industrial Revolution went from riches to 
rags. Put it differently, Argentina is an outlier and further research could try to replicate our analysis using 
the historical experience of other countries (ideally in a panel setting). That is,  to study the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in a panel of developing countries would strengthen 
what we know. Yet, the data requirements are very heavy indeed, with most developing countries lacking 
historical data even on key figures, such as per capita GDP, going back to the beginning or middle of the 
23XIXth century. This, of course, does not make this task less important.
The second suggestion refers to a possible methodological improvement, namely the application 
of  the  bivariate  GARCH  model  to  the  problem  at  hand  (albeit  the  relatively  small  number  of 
observations).  The   joint estimation of the political instability-financial development-growth system in a 
panel of countries would clearly represent progress and is something we feel future research should try to 
address.  
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